Spiral Dynamics

It seems that conservatives, libertarians, and liberals are all talking past each other. It is as if each group has their own way of thinking that excludes the others – whether it is because they consider one of the others less complex, more interested in feeling than thinking, or they consider what the others believe to be complete nonsense. If this is the case, is it possible for these groups to be able to talk to each other at all?

Don Beck and Christopher Cowan in their book "Spiral Dynamics" lay out a hierarchical theory of psycho-social development that may perhaps explain why these groups are talking past each other. In other words, they develop a theory that explains both the psychologies of individuals and the social structures of individual societies – and show that different people, and different societies, think in particular ways for particular reasons.

What they – and I, with some modifications – propose is that human societies go through spiraling cycles of new levels of complexity, switching between individualistic and collectivist forms of social organization. This is often preceded by individuals who lay the groundwork for the new social organization. And even when one form of social organization is left behind, there are people who continue to think that way. And, to make the situation even more complex, we continue to have aspects of the lower levels holding up the new levels of complexity.

But that is all very abstract. What we need are details. Basically, Beck and Cowan suggest that we start off in survivalist mode – what helps the individual survive is what we do. This is really the level of purely animal survival: food, drink, sleep, and sex. Next we develop into the roving bands/tribal mode – this is in the present day both athletic teams and the family unit, and is the kind of thinking we mean by "family values." This is the level of ritual, traditions and symbols. At its worst, it is the level of racism, superstition, and fear of change. Once this level becomes repressive, we get development of the powerful individual mode – this is in the present day in rock stars and rebellious teens in general, as well as in gang members. In the past, this was ancient Greece during the Iliad and the Odyssey, and Rome during the Roman Empire. This is the time of heroes and strong leadership, storytellers and mythology. To the extent that these two groups exist in the modern world, liberals have a tendency to label them as victims and to try to leap them – and sometimes those in the next level – into their kinds of societies. Since you cannot skip levels, since each level develops naturally out of previous levels, this is inevitably disastrous.

The next level is the level of authority and order. This is the realm of modern-day conservatives and those on the Right. At this level, it is believed that the world gains meaning from doing your duty, respecting traditions and heritage, and obeying the religious laws. Conservatives believe in good and evil, right and wrong, in sacrificing now for the future, love and charity, and in patriotism. At their worst, they fear trespassing upon the ordained order, are nationalistic and tend toward theocracy and authoritarianism. Many are royalists and, in the United States, have Puritan tendencies. Historically, this was medieval Christianity and the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle.

Following this is the development of capitalism and science – the realm of the modern-day libertarian, or classical liberal. There is strong support for reason and science. Such people and societies are optimistic and willing to take risks and are highly pragmatic in dealing with the world, even if they are idealistically pro-freedom in political issues. Such people and societies support personal rights and liberties, and were responsible for abolishing slavery – the irony of the most capitalist country in the world being the last to abolish slavery does not negate this fact. In fact, Emerson, whose thinking exemplifies this level of thinking, was a staunch abolitionist. Other thinkers at this level include Adam Smith, John Locke, Lord Acton, Voltaire, Machiavelli, and Descartes. At its worst, it promotes deterministic thinking and results in alienation.

Next is the development of egalitarian thinking – the realm of the modern-day Left. In fact, it was in the first expression of this level in the French Revolution that the terms Left and Right were first developed. It is equally interesting that the Left represented a new level of collectivist thinking beyond capitalist thinking, and the Right represented the old form of collectivist thinking in the Royalists and religious thinkers. At its best, liberalism emphasizes being socially responsible, caring for all people, finding ourselves, and treating workers well. It promotes pluralism and relativistic, postmodern, multidisciplinary thinking. At its worst, like all collectivist thinking, it promotes feeling over reasoning. And more, having much of its thought based in Marx, it leads to welfare states, socialism, communism, and even fascism, is anti-hierarchy, and is redistributionary. It is in fact deeply conservative of the status quo, and supports anti-free speech codes like political correctness. In opposing free speech and other individual liberties, people at this level tend to be in agreement with conservatives more than they are willing to admit.

Now, each of these levels tend to be exclusionary, rejecting each other. Those above reject those below as being too simplistic, and those below are just plain confused about what is going on at higher levels. But there are two levels (so far – more will emerge over time) above the egalitarian level – the integrationist and the holistic. The integrationist is a return to individualism, but it also sees the values of each of the levels below it. People at this level attempt to create a society were all of these levels can work together – both the individual psychologies and to develop a more integrated society. Thus, it tries to promote environmentalism, capitalism, religion, heroic individualism, and families simultaneously. Beauty, truth, and ethics are united into one way of thinking. Knowledge and competency are emphasized, as are fluid, nested hierarchies and interdisciplinary, chaotic, fractal thinking. This level is the first truly self-aware level, and there is no longer any fear of yourself or the world. Nietzsche may not have been the first of such thinkers, but he’s the transitional figure that allowed for this kind of thinking to emerge. And as for holistic thinking, which is only just beginning to emerge, we have such thinkers as Frederick Turner. Everything is understood to be connected to everything else, there is interest in wholeness of existence, and patterns and living systems are emphasized. Such thinkers are interested in bringing holistic order to the entire society – and thus supports a kind of holistic hierarchy, or holarchy.

This is but a brief outline of how the different forms of thinking evolved. I think if we come to understand how different forms of thinking emerge, we can stop speaking at cross-purposes to each other. The lower levels are all necessary parts of our thinking, and each level is needed to help us develop a more complex and just society. But conservatives, libertarians, and liberals won’t be able to do it. That is up to the integrationist and holistic thinkers, whose thinking is more complex, and who understand the value of each of the different levels.

Greetings from Greece

At the present time, I am sitting in my apartment inAthens, Greece. Now, for those of you reading this who don't know, I don't live in Greece -- I live in Dallas, TX, USA. But I am a week into my month-long vacation in Greece. So far I have seen the Agora with the Temple of Hephaestus, the Acropolis and Erecthion, the Temple of Zeus, and the Theater of Dionysus. The latter has impressed me the most -- but perhaps that is because of all the work I have done on tragedy.

Coming to Athens, one immediately comes to understand the ancient Greeks better. The sun is very intense -- far more intense than it is even in Texas. It is hot in Texas, but the sun is not really all that intense -- especially after you experience a truly intense sun. It is comfortable in the shade -- neither too hot nor too cool -- but the sun's intensity heats you up quickly. The sky is an intense blue, and the sunlight reflects off of everything. It is worst in places with shiny white marble -- which the ancients would have experiences quite a bit, with all their temples and important buildings being build of white marble. So you get a combination of intensely bright light and intense sunshine on your shoulders, neck, and head. Further, you do not realize until you come here just how steep the hills are. The Acropolis is on an extremely steep, tall hill. The Athenians had no choice but to be in shape, having built their city here.

It is strange how comfortable I feel here in Greece. I don't speak the language -- so grocery shopping has been very interesting, to say the least. Fortunately about a third of everything in Greece is in English, so I've been able to get by. The only thing missing in Greece is my beautiful girlfriend, Anna. I wish she could have come with me -- but I had already planned and made all the arrangements for this before I even met her. But from now on I'm most certainly taking her with me wherever I go.

The Power(lessness) of Imagination

When I was taking tai chi classes (something I should perhaps start doing again), my sifu told a visiting sifu that I had an extremely powerful imagination. He was asking us to imagine a tornado that spun down to our feet, then up to our hands in order to do a push-hands. So I did. The sifu I was practicing with was very surprised by what he felt from me, and said so. Thus, the comment. ANd it's true. Of course, as a poet, fiction-writer, and artist -- and philosopher -- I have to have a strong imagination. Wouldn't be able to do the work I do if I did not.

Thus, it is currently torture for me. I am on my way to Athens, Greece, where I will be spending a month away from my girlfriend, who I am very much in love with. I think of her all the time. I imagine her face before mine all the time. I feel like I can almost conjure her -- I wish I could conjure her -- but there is precisely where imagination ends. AH, what I wouldn't do to be able to actually comjure her to me with my imagination! Imagination can move the body, help you to control it, create new things in the world... but my beloved must stay in Texas while I go to Athens... If only I could imagine her with me, and not have to just imagine her with me.

Responsible Journalism

For those who have been reading my blog, you know that I have not typically discussed topical issues. However, the short article in Newsweek compels me to say something about responsible journalism.

Since when did journalism consider one uncorroborated source as sufficient to run a story? And, more, what on earth was Newsweek thinking? Do they not realize that there are consequences to the kind of story they ran?

The Koran is the holy book of Islam. Every copy is considered to be completely holy, and cannot be destroyed or disrespected. We in the West do not truly understand this, since the Bible, the Christian holy book, is not considered holy in quite the same way. It is the ideas, not the book proper, that is holy for Christians. For Moslems, it is the very book itself that is holy, because it contains the word of God. This is something we need to be aware of, so we do not do anything disrespectful to the Koran. We cannot be ignorant of others' cultures. We are not alone in the world.

Thus, anyone in the military caught desecrating the Koran should be punished. Our government, precisely because of the First Amendment, should show nothing but the utmost respect for all religions, religious practices, and religious objects. Our military has had a history of respecting historical and religious sites and has typically gone out of its way not to even damage these sites during a war. At the same time, while those of high military rank have tried to respect such sites, we need to make sure that all of our troops understand this policy.

At the same time, Newsweek acted highly irresponsibly on several levels -- not just the level of reporting something given to them by one source. The editors of Newsweek also acted irresponsibly in reporting the incident at all, since reporting such an incident was bound to have at minimum the outcome it has actually had so far -- riots in some Islamic countries. If we assume the best, this means that the editors at Newsweek were completely ignorant of the importance of the Koran to Islam -- meaning they had no idea what the consequences of their actions would be. If we are considerably less generous, and propose that it was reported in order to harm the President's image in the world, then the editors of Newsweek are responsible for purposefully putting the U.S. in danger of going to war with all 1.5 billion Moslems. I propose both extremes, since it is difficult to say if either, or something inbetween, is the truth of the matter.

While Newsweek and every other news outlet has the First Amendment right to publish anything they want, without legal consequences, they need to be more responsible in what they choose to publish, since what they publish could result in hundred, thousands, or -- if what they reported were to result in a war with all of Islam -- millions of people dying. And if the U.S. system were to collapse because of a sustained war with 1.5 billion people, then Newsweek and other news outlets would most likely find themselves in a system where it would be illegal to publish certain things -- as is the case in most countries in the world. The freedom to do something does not mean that you always SHOULD do something. When a news outlet considers publishing something, they should consider the outcome of what they report. It is no conincident that when the news reports high school shootings, that more high school shootings occur -- when they report child abductions, more abductions occur. Reporting crimes results in copycat crimes. Does this mean that we should remain blissfully ignorant of the world? Of course not. The news does have a responsiblity to report newsworthy events. But the fact is, we are ignorant of the world -- and when the kind of ignorance the editors at Newsweek exhibited occurs, the outcome is anything put blissful. The news outlets need to become less ignorant of the world before they go around reporting on it. When they do, their reporting will become more responsible -- and more coherent -- than it is. And perhaps they will even report on the things that matter -- international news -- rather than on much of the irrelevancies that happen in the U.S. (Michael Jackson, the crime de jour that gets extended to several weeks or months, etc.). And we would also not have ignorant people like Lou Dobbs on CNN spreading his complete ignorance of economics to the U.S. as if he were an expert in the field. He isn't. And CNN is equally irresponsible for giving such a person his own show to talk about a field he clearly knows nothing about.

Hades

What do I need to do to get what I want? What do I want? I... What do I want? I feel driven toward... what? Art? For certain. Philosophy? It seems more and more to be a drive. A poet philosopher? A philosopher poet? I am the incarnation of transference. I want to transfer my ideas to others. I want to transfer my vision to others. I want to transfer my self to others. I want to carry myself across into others so I never die, in mind or material. I have a strong sex drive. I feel a drive to make art. I feel a drive to philosophize. I am ruled by the madness of Eros and the Muses. As Socrates says in Phaedrus, philosophy comes from the Muses of Astronomy – and thus of the sciences – and of epic poetry. How many more Muses can I combine? What drive is that, to merge the Muses, make them one? And what of Eros? That I have far fewer visitations from. Well, that’s not true. He seems to visit me while neglecting those he has helped me fall in love with. Where is Aphrodite when I need her? The two need to team up with each other when it comes to me, so Eros doesn’t continue to drive me mad, as he’s driven me mad before.

How many have been guided to Hades by Eros? And how many were brought back up by the Muses? Ah, the Muses, who have helped me maintain my madness in a more productive way than when I was driven into Hades by Eros. Did he guide or drive me? The way up and the way down are the same. He drove me by guiding me there. And the Muses carried me up, out of the dark pit Eros brought me to. And yet, I miss the madness of Eros. I am lonely for Eros, for the chemicals my body emits with the repeated long touch of someone, that make me feel warm. Lovely chocolate has helped me through the early and worst parts, but now I feel chocolate is hardly substitute. I have tried substitutes, and none compare or can even add up to in any way to two nude bodies embraced in pleasure, as Eros and Aphrodite mean for us to be. I can only control Eros so much, for so long, before I feel more and more like giving in. Abstinence is not moderation – I am not interested in asceticism. There is no virtue in that. Yet I have shown that I have virtue enough to not give in as much as my drives desire – but where is the balance? I want a war between overindulgence and asceticism that will bring a balance of Eros in my life. I want a return to a life of erotic play. Only then can I not drown in the obsession of Eros, so I can spend more time and drive with the Muses.

Can I chose my madness, or have those who make us mad chosen me? Eros chose me, of that I am certain. The Muses have certainly chosen me. The madness of initiation? To what have I or need I be initiated into to require Dionysus? Nor do I think I have the madness of prophesy – so Apollo too has not chosen me. Eros and the Muses – those two have been enough and seem to be sufficient. I chose the madness of Eros. Only one of these who rule over madness is not enough to make us take the complete trip to and through and out of Hades. Does it take one to drive us there, another to free us? And how often is it Eros or Aphrodite who drive us there? Dante said it was Virgil who led him through Hell, but it was his love for Beatrice that drove him there. Odysseus even went to Hades so he could get home to his wife. And Orpheus, the most beautiful singer and poet in Greek myth, went down to Hades to bring back his beloved Eurydice. I too was driven into Hades by a woman – each time I was driven there. But it was the Muses who, again, brought me back, though my weeping and wails fed Hades well.

But why speak of traveling to Hades and being brought up by art? These myths are part of our deep archetypes and have gone on to become cliches. Among some people, anyway. But in a real sense, they can never become cliches, because we are always forever forgetting their lessons. We keep telling stories of descents into Hades because we forget the old ones, and feel we need to retell them using our own myths – this is what renews the stories. This is why the stories of Orestes and Dante are both so interesting and so different. Cliches are those things we say that we know and never forget. Romance books are all cliches. True novels never are. We all live chiched lives, those lives that are forgettable because they are so easily remembered. An uncliched life is lived in such a way that we cannot forget it, though we inevitably forget the lessons it could have taught us. This is the soul of great art, and why we come at it anew each time. Artists live such lives that would seem new each time through, sometimes in their actual lives, and always in the lives of their art. This is the mark of a true artist, and why a true artist can never, himself, know if he really is a true artist – and among readers, viewers, listeners of the works there will always be endless debate about their value, level of value, reasons for their value. So I cannot say that I myself am or will ever be one of these artists – yet I feel the call of the Muses. I feel their call, and can never know if I have or will ever measure up. And yet, I serve under their rule. And I chose to serve, though the Muses have equally chosen me. It is healthier to chose one’s fate – rejecting it can lead one into sorrow or madness of the worst kind. But it is a fate that is indeed chooseable. Fate, like the world, is not deterministic. By choosing to abide by the rule of the Muses, I have chosen to try to measure up to that choice. It is a great honor to be chosen by the Muses, and it requires much work to live up to that honor.

Ah, the likelihood of life. We do not know that for which any of us are chosen. I started off with the certainty I would become a scientist. I majored in molecular biology in college and worked on a Master’s degree in molecular biology for two years. And then Eros drove me mad, and the Muses brought me back. And now I am a poet because I cannot stop writing poetry. I am a short story writer because I cannot stop writing short stories. I am a novelist because I cannot stop writing novels. I am a lover of beauty because beauty called me forth to reproduce it in art. I am a lover of the arts, especially of literature, because the arts are the beautiful creations of the mind of man, and as such are the most beautiful of objects, more beautiful even than their creators. And, once the doors of perception are cleansed, we will see the world as it truly is: beautiful. This is what I was able to see by descending into the depths – I was able to see beauty in all its manifestations, to understand the beautiful nature of the world, and that drove me to want to make it more beautiful by adding more beauty to it, deepening and complexifying the beauty of the world. The tragedy is that there is no certainty that it will last – or that anything will last. In the end, will we all be swallowed up in the sun’s expansion? And even personally, will my work survive beyond my life? Will my genetic material? At the moment, my work looks to be the likeliest candidate for a kind of immortality. But I will take it – my work can pass my energy on into the future, and I will not complain. My work is myself at the moment of creation. It is a gift I hope is worthy of giving. I have had a difficult time getting others to accept my gifts. Perhaps they are not (yet? I hope) worthy of being given. Yet, I will continue to offer them.

Perhaps calling my work a gift seems narcissistic? There is a reason the narcissus is holy to Hades. It is narcissistic to believe that the gift of art we who have been to Hades have received should then be passed on, through us, to others. It is narcissistic to believe that anyone should care how we view the world, what we think, or what we feel. Yet that is the role of every teacher: every teacher has proclaimed that they have knowledge that you should have, and that they should teach it to you. The artist too is a teacher, as is the philosopher, and the preacher too. Who am I to offer a gift? The gift has first been given to me – and now I must, now I am compelled to give it to others. I have taken on the role of teaching others of the gift of beauty through the works that I am compelled to create. It is the gift of me that I hope others will take – my art if not my body. The drive given me by the Muses, even if no one will allow me to fulfill the drive given me by Eros. Are the Muses enough? I hope they are, and fear they are not. Eros will have to be placated, or other trips to Hades could occur – will the Muses always be able to rescue me?

Models for Thinking

In the Phaedrus, Plato says that he likes dividing things up into categories because it aides in thinking. Nietzsche came along 2300 years later to remind us that conceptual categories are, ultimately, artificial, and that we need to challenge them periodically, and remember that the divisions among things are not really so clear-cut.

That having been said, let me lay out several models I am using that determine my thinking.

1) information theory. I support an ontology of information. If something is inform, it has no form. If something informs, it gives form. Thus, information is that which is without form, yet gives form. All things in the universe are information, and the universe itself began as information and continues to exist as information.

2) chaos theory and fractal gemoetry. All things in the universe are self-similar regardless of scale, in several different fractal gemoetries.

3) emergence. All laws of the universe evolved from separate entities interacting to give rise ot those laws. These laws are called strange attractors.

4) nested hierarchies. Everything in the universe evolved into its level of complexity from lower levels of complexity. Biology evolved from chemistry which evolved from quantum physics (atoms), and atoms evolved from quantum strings. New levels of complexity arise naturally from lower levels of complexity as the entities of that lower level interact as a complex, dynamic system.

The idea of nested hierarchies comes in several flavors:

1) the physical model exemplified by J.T. Fraser's umwelt theory of time. With his model, the timeless level of pure chaos evolved into the probablistic time of quantum physics, whihc evolved into the deterministic time of chemistry (Newtonian physics), which evolved into the weakly forward direction of biotemporality (biological time), which evolved into the strongly forward direction of nootemporality (human time). Each level contains more and more time. And, I would argue, each new level becomes increasingly fractal in nature.

2) the human cognitive and social model developed by Don Beck. WIth his model, the pure survialism of animal life evolved into the weak communitarian structures of tribalism, which evolved into the weak individualism of Achilles-type heroism/belief in power gods, which evolved into the stronger communitarianism of authoritarian-religious systems (like Medieval Christianity of modern-day Islam), which evolved into the stronger individualism of the capitalist/scientific social system (the Modern Era in Europe and America), which evolved into the stronger communitarianism of secular egalitarianism (Marxism/Communism, environmentalism, postmodernism), which evolved into integralism, which recognizes the value of each of the lower levels (lower in the sense of being less complex, as each level is more complex than the lower levels), which evolved into holism, which attempts to more smoothly unify all the lower levels. The last two levels recognize the value of complex, fluid, nested hierarchies, as opposed to the egalitarian level, which rejects all hierarchies, and the authoritarian level, which tries to impose rigid hierarchies on everyone.

To have an even more integrationist way of thinking, we cannot forget these four things: I-we-it-its : individualism-communitarianism-traditional science-systems science. And these must be fully integrated into the two forms of nested hierarchy mentioned above (as those two ideas must themselves be integrated).

These are a few of the models with which I am thinking. Which should help to make sense of much of what I have said and will say from now on in the blog.

Pointless Political Conversations

It has become pointless to have political conversations lately. Especially among what are otherwise intelligent people. And I am including people who, on many specific issues, agree with me. I am talking about the blind, knee-jerk anti-Bush people.
Now let me make one thing perfectly clear: I am not pro-Bush. I opposed his support for increased social spending, his support for subsidies, his educational reforms . . . I could go on and on. But this opposition is substantive – it is opposition to particular things. And it does not prevent me from supporting Bush on things I do agree with him on, like his explicitly changing the policy of the United States regarding our support of dictatorships. Does this mean we have in fact stopped supporting dictators? Of course not. If it requires supporting the current government in Tajikistan in order to have permanent bases to fight al Qaida in Afghanistan and to support the new democratic government there, obviously we will. What should be at issue is whether or not we work to democratize Tajikistan once we are there. But this is not the issue with the anti-Bush people. No evidence of Bush putting democratic governments in Afghanistan or Iraq (or suggestions that this is the first time we have in fact installed a democratic government rather than a dictator of our own choosing since WWII) will suffice. What matters is that in this one instance (and ignoring any contingent reasons why) is that we are in some way supporting a dictator by having a base in his country rather than immediately overthrowing that government – which itself ignores the fact that it would greatly weaken our current position in the region where we are hunting for Osama bin Laden. But practical concerns fall on deaf ears when it comes to the Bush haters. If he is doing it, it must be wrong.
Of course, the anti-Bush people also argue against any military action Bush undertakes. They claim concern for the number of troop deaths, though their every solution would likely (if history is any indication) incur more American deaths. But they only come up with these ideas because they are against Bush’s actions. If they were Al Gore’s actions (ignoring the fact that it is highly unlikely Gore would have pursued any pro-democracy foreign policy – though he would have likely still had bases in Tajikistan to support our actions in Afghanistan), there would be no opposition. It would be "clear" to the anti-Bush people that Gore was doing what was right and just and good. It is only because it is Bush who is doing it that it is seen as bad and wrong and insidious regarding his motives.
Much of this comes from a non-skeptical reading of a lot of anti-Bush literature. Now, every four years, we get a plethora of books praising or condemning the candidates and the newly elected leader. The difference seems to be that now people are accepting all they read at face value – even otherwise intelligent people. It was a former CIA agent who wrote this or that anti-Bush book, so it must be true. Why is there no questioning of motives? At a time when the CIA is under question for its failures leading up to 9-11, is being massively reformed, and is even having much of its power taken away and put into the hands of a new cabinet position – all of which was supported in one way or another by Bush – is it unreasonable to question the motives of a CIA agent who writes an anti-Bush book? Certainly it is better for the agent to attack the President than it is to admit to his, and his organization’s, massive failings. This is pure and simple loyalty to the CIA. Yet too many people (actually, almost everyone) only read what supports what they already believe, what will present them with the kinds of facts that will support what they want to believe, accept it at face value, without question, and will not hear contrary facts, let alone seek them out.
If for no other reason, I cannot wait for Bush to leave office so perhaps a semblance of intelligent political discussion can return. I am tired of people excusing one person or party for all of their idiocies, while hating another for all of the same idiocies. And I am equally tired of people attacking or opposing something a person or a party supports just because that person or party supports it. Bush proposes the same exact social security reforms some Democrats had proposed under Clinton, and now those same Democrats oppose the reforms. Anyone who switches positions just because someone in the other party supports it should be thrown out of office. All they want to do is oppose – they are for nothing. And they are also good for nothing. Least of all actual dialogue.

On Adam Smith

I recently found a book by James R. Otteson titled Adam Smith’s Marketplace of Life, the goal of which is to synthesize Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, which argues for people acting in their own rational self-interest so that everyone may be better off, and his The Theory of Moral Sentiments, which argues for mutual sympathy and community as the sources of morality. In modern American politics, the liberals reject this connection entirely, while the conservatives don’t see any point in even making the connection.
But the connection is there, and it is important to make this connection. Smith was writing in the Scottish philosophical tradition, which developed a much different theory of human nature, including theories of equality and individualism, than did the Continental European philosophical tradition, which included Decartes, Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Heidegger.

Before I continue, let me introduce a concept: the world can be viewed as digital, analog, or both. Digital comes from the Latin digitus, for finger. It is countable and separable – a digit is a number. Number comes from the Latin numerus, meaning number and division, and numerus comes from nom-eso, which also gives rise to the Greek nomos, meaning portion, custom, law, division, and melody. Nom comes from gno, which gives rise to knowledge and noble, and "noble" is one way to translate the Greek to kalon, which means not only noble, but also beautiful, just, and fair. Analog comes from analogous, meaning alike. Analog comes from the Greek ana-, complete, and logos, meaning explanation, collection, discourse, or account. A digital view of the world sees the world as divided, pluralistic; an analog view of the world sees the world as one, unified. As Heraclitus says, "It is wise, listening not to me but to the report [logos], to agree [homologein] that all things are one" (K. XXXVI). The view I am propounding agrees with Heraclitus that physis, logos, and nomos are intimately connected. If dynamic systems such as cultures and economies are both analog and digital, we again have an agonal unity of opposites, a complete account explainable only as parts, giving rise to greater complexity in the dynamic system arising out of their interaction. It is important to understand that the world is neither merely digital/fragmented nor merely analog/continuous in order to both have a clearer, more accurate understanding of the scientifically explainable parts of the world, and for aesthetic, ethical, and political reasons (as suggested by the connection of "digital" to to kalon and nomos). There are important consequences for our aesthetics, ethics, and politics if we hold to this (or any) particular (meta)physical view.

If the world is merely digital, the parts cannot interact. If the world is merely analog, it is indistinct. If it is both simultaneously – analog-unified and digital-plural – it has communication, coordination, cooperation, and co-action among its parts. It has unity in variety, and is thus beautiful.

In Individualism and Economic Order, F. A. Hayek points out the dangers of the digital-exclusive view – showing it can and usually does lead to the analogical view (too fine a texture looks like a solid color). The digital-exclusive view leads to bad games (social systems, economic systems, government), since information cannot be shared among players. A good game-system is one where communication – thus, community – is possible. Hayek says there are two kinds of individualism. One is based on rational philosophy, which started with René Descartes and was further developed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Voltaire, Emmanuel Kant, Georg W. F. Hegel, Arthur Schopenhauer, and the existentialists, including Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Simone de Beauvoir (I am sure the last three would object to being put in the "rationalist" tradition, but their ideas did not really deviate much from Kant’s). I will call this Cartesian Individualism (the digital-exclusive view). The other is in the Scottish tradition of David Hume, Bernard Mandeville, Josiah Tucker, Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, and John Locke, and further developed by Edmund Burke, Alexis de Tocqueville and Lord Acton (the digital-analog agonal view). Cartesian Individualism sees man as rational; the Scottish tradition does not see man as fully rational, but also, perhaps primarily, influenced by his drives, wants and needs of the moment. These different views give rise to different forms of individualism. Perhaps the best way to show the differences would be to put the two traditions side by side in a table showing the difference Hayek sees between the two, and the consequences of each of these, traditions:

COMPARISONS OF TWO PHILOSOPHIES OF INDIVIDUALISM

SCOTTISH (DIGITAL-ANALOG)

the individual is found within the social, leading to free markets
man is not always rational, or even capable of always being rational – man also has impulses and instincts
since man is not rational, he cannot design or plan something like a society or economy
the individual participates in the social (cooperates) through being selfish
"If left free, men will often achieve more than individual human reason could design or foresee" (11).
It is not necessary to find good men to run the society, meaning anyone can play
it is not necessary for us to become better than we already are, making it easy to enter the game to play it
freedom is granted to all
no one group never always wins, which keeps people playing
reason is seen "as an interpersonal process in which anyone’s contribution is tested and corrected by others" (15)
inherently unequal people are treated equally
inherent inequality allows diversity
hierarchical – intermediates encouraged

CARTESIAN (DIGITAL-EXCLUSIVE)

radical individualism, leading (ironically (?)) to socialism
man is rational and has no instincts and can always control his impulses
since man is rational, he can create through planning the ideal society or economy
individual vs. the social – i.e., selfishness vs. cooperation – therefore need coercion
"social processes can be made to serve human ends only if they are subjected to the control of individual human reason" (10)
only the best can or should run society and make economic decisions – few can play
men need to be improved (presumably made more rational) before a good economy or society can be created – hard to play
freedom granted only to the good and wise
the "good and wise," "rational" rulers always win – no reason to play the game
reason found in the individual, especially in certain "good and wise" individuals
people are made equal in actuality – thus, have to arbitrarily assign tasks
only State and Individual, thus flattening society – intermediates suppressed


The Scottish form of individualism, by being digital-analogical, provides us with a broader, more inclusive set of game rules. Anyone can play the social and economic games – making these systems more complex by containing more parts acting in coordination and cooperation. Man does not have to be "improved" for systems set up using Scottish principles to work as he does for those using Cartesian principles (historical examples of attempts to "improve" man to make him more suitable for "rationally" designed societies include the Holocaust in Nazi Germany, the Terror of Revolutionary France, and the slaughters of millions in the Marxist states of the Soviet Union, Maoist China, and Cambodia). In the Cartesian view, there is one rationality; but in the Scottish view, there are many, which can often come into conflict.

The field in which we operate is our democratic society. The ideal democratic system includes, of course, the various levels of government, but it also encompasses every other organized part of society, including the neighborhood, family, workplace, political party, voluntary or nongovernmental organization, transnational corporation, Internet, and a variety of multilateral organizations. Operating within such a spectrum of responsibility progressively demands the most that individuals can give. Instead of requiring full mastery at the outset, this system establishes conditions under which human beings can achieve their full potential, through their participation, their education, and their receipt of the benefits which the system can produce. ( Craig Eisendrath, At War With Time, 277)

One can make a rational decision about an immediate individualistic concern, one about a long-term individualistic concern, one about one’s family, one for social organizations (i.e., churches, schools, businesses), one for one’s city, county, state, and/or country, one for one’s friends, one for strangers, etc. – all of which could come into conflict (something could be rational for the individual, but not for the family, etc.). This recognizes that individual decisions can and often do effect and affect others through the different levels of society between the individual and the state.

If we take the Scottish view that a person’s knowledge and interests are limited, making our actions limited to a tiny sphere of influence – our family and friends, our churches, schools and businesses, the intermediate social groups the rationalists suppress and the Scottish encourage – we see a highly complex society emerging: the individual influences small social groups, the small social groups influence the individual, and both interact to influence larger social groups, which feeds back to the smaller groups. There is a series of nested hierarchies where each person acts as a digital element, acting in a digital-analogical way, communicating information to other digital elements to create smaller cultural subsystems – the digital elements – of the larger culture. The same individual can have an effect on a school, a church, a business, and a local government, each of which will have larger effects on society at large. More people have more influence over society. And man does not have to be "improved" – the worst can be canceled out by the best. In what other country than the United States and other Western-style democratic republics does it really not matter who the President or Prime Minister is? – any mischief the American President may want to make is more often than not counterbalanced by two houses of Congress, a Supreme Court, and the voters’ opinions (these same voters who can vote the President out after four years if worse comes to worse, or vote in a different party during midterm elections). These principles, upon which the free market is based, are "an effective way of making man take part in a process more complex and extended than he could comprehend" (Hayek, 14-5). Perfect knowledge is not needed to participate. One can have a considerable amount of uncertainty, and still do well. We can reduce uncertainty through education, increasing our own individual knowledge, but we are still left with a plethora of things which we will never have the time to learn.

There needs to be a way for individuals, with their limited information, knowledge, etc., to enter into a highly complex game, to be able to participate in the game itself. The way to allow someone into a highly complex game is by not having barriers to their entering and playing the game in the first place. And, if you do choose to play, and take large risks while playing, you should be able to reap a correspondingly larger reward. To have a good game,
any workable individualist order must be so framed not only so that the relative remunerations the individual can expect from the different uses of his abilities and resources correspond to the relative utility of the result of his efforts to others but also that these remunerations correspond to the objective results of his efforts rather than to their subjective merits. (21)

And the game must not be constructed of iron-clad laws, but of flexible rules (not too flexible, as those of pragmatism, nor too rigid, as those of absolute principles, both of which, as opposed to the idea of general principles, cannot create a system, since principles are the strange attractors, and neither pragmatism nor iron-clad absolutes create attractors). These are also good guidelines for creating works of art and literature, and for writing works of philosophy, theory, and criticism.

An example of good game rules are our "traditions and conventions . . . [which] evolve in a free society and . . . , without being enforceable, establish flexible but normally deserved rules that make the behavior of other people predictable in a high degree" (Hayek, 23). Most social rules should be those agreed upon and practiced by most of the people most of the time, enforced by subtle social pressures, not the use and threat of physical force. "In the social sciences the things are what people think they are. Money is money, a word is a word, a cosmetic is a cosmetic, if and because somebody thinks they are" (Hayek, 60). They are rules because we agree they are – they are socially constructed. With these kinds of rules, those we find in the free market, we have various choices – while with orders or iron-clad laws, we get no real choices. Any choice is better than none. "It is better to have a choice between several unpleasant alternatives than being coerced into one" (Hayek 24).

A word of caution: just because the world has a socially constructed element, it does not follow that all the world is socially constructed. To claim it is brings us to the problems with pragmatism, where no system at all can be constructed. Hayek says pragmatism is "the preference for proceeding from particular instance to particular instance," where the rule-maker "decides each question "on its merits""(1). With pragmatism, expediency and compromise lead us "to a system in which order is created by direct commands" (1). "Without principles we drift," and we are led "to a state of affairs which nobody wanted" (2). Pragmatism makes it possible to change the rules with each move in the game – imagine a game master watching a game being played between two people, and changing the rules whenever he wished. This would lead to the players in each move trying to gain the game master’s favor. They would try to bribe the game master rather than play the game. If this sounds like how big business is conducted, with the government as the game master, we can see why. How much money do businesses waste trying to influence "pragmatic" government officials? With basic principles, everyone is clear what the rules are and that they cannot – or are very difficult to – change. The game players concentrate on the playing of the game itself rather than coming up with strategies to influence some game master. With the use of general principles, the game master can all but be done away with.

The world Adam Smith envisioned was thus one where people cooperated because they worked in their own self-interest – but not exploitatively. Free market systems work because we have sympathy for others, and we want to engage in actions where "if you do something good for me, I will do something good for you," versus the way governments necessarily act: "unless you do something good for me, I will do something bad to you." Governments only help foster community when they prevent individuals and groups from engaging in the latter type of behavior. Those who try to dissolve community bonds and flatten out the natural hierarchies that develop in a culture only seek to create a situation where people are loyal only to them, and not to the series of smaller groups to which they belong. Those who adopt the Cartesian view of humankind are interested only in ruling others. That is why they oppose free markets and the creation of true communities.

Some Comments on Postmodernism

The exclusively digital approach to aesthetics, ethics, and politics is better known as postmodernism, pluralism, and multiculturalism. While this approach has been a necessary corrective to the analogical world view, if we take the digital view to its logical conclusion, and reject the analogical as a constituent part of the world, all it can do is create alienation – among different races, different cultures, between men and women, and, if we take Quine’s view that we never actually understand one another, among each and every individual. If we take what Quine says in a very limited way, he has a point, but an extreme view makes the mistake of thinking that if there is any noise – ambiguity – in communication, we cannot communicate; whereas information theory says we need noise if we are going to have any communication at all.

An analogical view may lead us to collectivism, including communism, but an exclusively digital view leads to the alienation found in postmodern radical individualism. The consequence of this digital world view is postmodernists telling us we cannot understand one another. Men cannot understand women, and vice versa. Different races and cultures cannot understand each other, we cannot understand anything that happened in the past, and there is the suggestion that we cannot really understand each other. The consequence of this is an increasing fragmentation of society, creating warring factions (men vs. women, minorities vs. majorities, secular vs. religion), and increasing distrust among people.

Many postmodern theorists have observed that one of the features of modern Western culture is its increasing fragmentation and alienation, a favorite theme of many Marxists. It is ironic that some of these same critics are the very people making the problem worse. If we cannot understand one another, we are incapable of projecting ourselves into another’s situation. While this is literally true in a factual sense, it is in another sense not true at all. We can and do have empathy for others, basing that empathy on related experiences. While I may not understand perfectly an intellectual woman’s complaint that most men do not take her seriously as a thinker, I do understand the sting of not being taken seriously, especially when I know I know more about a subject than the person who is not taking me seriously as a thinker. Only if we can place ourselves in another person’s situation can we develop the empathy needed to be moral or to effect any sort of positive social change.

Studies show orangutans, a distant cousin, can putting themselves into others’ minds. If food is placed out of reach of a caged orangutan, and a person is brought in with a bucket on his head and placed near the orangutan’s cage, without hesitation the orangutan will take the bucket off the person’s head and physically point the person in the direction of the food. The orangutan knows the person cannot see the food if he has a bucket on his head. How could the orangutan know this if it could not project itself into the mind of the person with the bucket on his head? This is a cognitive feature of the great apes, including humans, whose ability to do this developed even more with the advent of language. "One of the common ancestor species of all the living great apes and humans was the first in which individuals realized that others had viewpoints and knowledge different from their own, and could build up novel sequences of actions" (Richard W. Byrne, Tree of Origin, 169).

This ability is why were are capable of telling stories – including fiction. To say we cannot (or should not) do this is to say we are (or should be) cognitively less complex than the other great apes and place us on the cognitive level of monkeys. This attitude goes beyond being merely anti-human, to being anti-great ape. It is anti-language since "Evolution of language would be impossible in a species in which individuals could not imagine that other individuals know things that they do not know themselves" (Byrne, 172). The consequence of this anti-theory-of-mind view for literature has been the creation of a shallow sort of minimalism that avoids letting the reader know about anything more than the actions of the characters, on this theory that we cannot know what others think – so the author should not bother to tell us what his characters think, since he cannot even know. If they think at all.

Postmodernism creates social ruptures – it is anti-social in nature. It puts up barriers between men and women. Postmodernism’s radical individualism says there is an abyss of difference between men and women. The collectivism inherent in the Franco-German individualist tradition, whose egalitarian individualism attempts to eliminate all difference, suggests there is no difference between men and women. Specifically, women have been told they should be more like men. This has created an identity crisis in many women. They are told by their culture (which has been influenced by the pro-masculinizing gender feminists) they should be one thing, and by their biology and psychology they should be something else. I fear American women will soon face a tragic crisis, which can only be headed off if women are allowed by this culture to be women in the fullest sense, and not made into either men or relegated into some sort of submissive role, as we had in the past, and as we still find in many cultures around the world.

Postmodernism, far from being a solution to this crisis, only makes the problem worse. And gender feminism, by insisting that there are no fundamental behavioral differences between men and women, only reinforces the prejudice that differences are inherently bad and unequal. It is those feminists who perpetuate the belief that femininity is inferior. Despite what they think, it is not. American culture in particular is sorely lacking in femininity – not the cultural myths we once held about how women should act, but natural femininity, which can come about in a more inclusive, open culture – this lack is primarily the fault of the gender feminists, who insist that our genetic differences make no difference. This is creating the groundwork for a tragic situation, where women are pushed by culture to go beyond their own physis without even trying to understand their physis (vs. the myths of their physis). One hopes we learn the outcome through works of literature, including plays and film, rather than within society itself.

This anti-social element is found not only in relations among men and women, but among races and cultures too. I welcome the emphasis on multiculturalism, as it creates the potential for a much richer, more complex American (and world) culture, but the way postmodernism practices it creates a number of problems. What are we to do with a culture that practices clitorectomy? Or oppresses women? Or practices genocide? Are we to just consider these a legitimate part of the rich tapestry of humanity? Postmodernism’s insistence that we cannot judge anyone – particularly other cultures – puts us in a serious dilemma in considering these situations. I think there are few who support genocide, but how can one come to say genocide is wrong if one does not make some sort of judgement, or insist there is some sort of universal we should be guided by? I asked Cynthia Haynes (a self-identified postmodernist) this question, and she told me the only thing she does not tolerate is intolerance. But isn’t the intolerance of intolerance itself a universalizing view? One assumes she (and other postmodernists) wishes everyone was intolerant of intolerance. But if one wishes for such an overarching view, one’s entire postmodern world view collapses (of course, the very fact that postmodernism is a world view and, thus, a grand narrative, makes it collapse, imploded by its own hypocrisy).

Postmodern multiculturalism will not work. But we should not return to a "melting pot" view either. Why not a mixture of the two, maintaining cultural identity while integrating everyone into, for example, the American (or, better, world) culture? This view presumes there are more than two societal levels – the individual and the culture/state – which goes against the Franco-German philosophical tradition leading to postmodernism. It is possible – I would say preferable – that there is more than just the individual and her culture. Why can’t a person be an individual, a member of a family (nuclear and extended), a member of a community, a subculture, an organization (if not several), including churches, clubs, schools, etc., an overarching culture, and a citizen of a state, a country, and the world? If there are this many levels between an individual and the government, the government’s power over that individual is weakened, and the influence of that government (and any who wish to influence that government, the culture of a country through the government, etc.), is greatly weakened – which may explain why many pro-statist postmodernists oppose this view.

Postmodernism’s anti-social view of humanity makes it anti-human. Humans are a social species, like all the great apes (even the apparently solitary orangutan will socialize when food is abundant), most monkeys, lions, elephants, dolphins, and wolves. Social species are different from and have more complex behavior than herd or schooling species, like antelope, sheep, or sardines, in that there is little to no bonding among the members of the herd. Individual members are less likely than social animals to aid unrelated or distantly related members of the herd. It seems postmodernists wish to make us act more like herd than social animals.

Review of Richard Wolin's "The Seduction of Unreason"

Calling someone a "fascist" or a "Nazi" is beginning to become meaningless. All you have to do is disagree with anything a leftist believes, and you are immediately slapped by them with one of those labels. However, this is not what Richard Wolin is doing in his book "The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism."
In this book Wolin is looking at historical fascism, and the influence of fascism on much of what passes as philosophy nowadays. He identifies fascism with counter-enlightenment thinking. Since Wolin is clearly a scholar of Continental philosophy, Enlightenment philosophy is for him primarily that of Voltaire, Diderot, and the other thinkers of the French Enlightenment. The reaction to the Enlightenment came in several forms, from Romanticism to various forms of racism and nationalism. It is when the Nietzschean form of Romanticism (or, at least, sections taken out of context) was combined with ideas of racism and nationalism (one cannot really object on the grounds of reason that this is a contradiction, since Nietzsche both hated anti-Semites and nationalism, since the people who combined them were enemies of reason) that the various forms of fascism were born – the most commonly known being Italian fascism and Nazism. The author does an excellent reading of Nietzsche as the 20th century thinkers have misread him, noting only at the end of his chapter on Nietzsche that they were in fact misreading him.
Wolin spends each chapter covering different thinkers. But before we get to the ones he does cover, I think I should mention the one thinker he does not cover at all in his own chapter: Martin Heidegger. It may seem odd that Heidegger, who said that reason was an adversary to thought, was an actual member of the Nazi party, and who never recanted his Nazism nor apologized for what the Nazis did, should be left out, especially considering the fact that it is Heidegger’s ideas that have influenced postmodern thinking more than any others – including perhaps Nietzsche’s. However, Wolin is interested in exposing those we do not normally see as fascists. And besides, Heidegger’s associations with the Nazis are well documented – most recently in Charles Bambach’s book "Heidegger’s Roots."
So let us talk about those Wolin does talk about.
The first unexpected name to arise is Carl Jung. It may seem odd as first glance to include Jung, who was, after all, Freud’s handpicked successor at one time. However, Wolin shows several of Jung’s writings that were explicitly anti-Semitic. Further, Jung had a 10% quota on the number of Jewish psychologists who could join his Analytical Psychology Club of Zurich as regular members, only doing away with it in 1950. Jung also apparently thought of his famous ideas of the archetypes as being specifically Aryan in nature, and that Jews especially do not have them, or at least have them only weakly. The reason for this was that Jung saw the archetypes as essentially pagan in origin. Further, Wolin points out that "Jung eagerly cooperated with the Goring Institute for Psychological Research and Psychotherapy, accepting the presidency of the Nazi-run General Medical Society for Psychotherapy and serving as editor for its journal, the Zentralblatt fur Psychotherapie" (74). The fact that Jung headed a Nazi society for psychotherapy and cooperated with Nazi psychological research should concern anybody. It’s no wonder he was considered for war crimes after World War II.
The next surprise – and even more surprising – is the case of Hans-Georg Gadamer, whose mentor was none other than Heidegger. Certainly, this association is hardly enough. Karl Jaspers was a friend of Heidegger, but did not join the Nazis in any way. But Gadamer apparently decided to associate himself with the Nazis just to further his career (which only raises the question of who should be condemned more – Heidegger for actually believing in Nazism, or Gadamer for using what the Nazis were doing to further his own career), by signing pro-Hitler petitions, voluntarily enrolling in a Nazi political reeducation camp, joining the National Socialist Teacher’s Association, and volunteering to give lectures in Nazi-held Paris in order to help convert the French intellectuals (who were not given any other choice but to attend). This is most damning when we consider the fact that one did not have to become a member of the Nazi party, or associate with them at all, to work in the universities.
Wolin begins his section on the French thinkers’ associations with fascism with a chapter titled "Left Fascism," which deals with the ideas of Georges Bataille. Bataille, whose influences included Nietzsche and the Marquis de Sade, is considered by many to be the father of poststructuralism, out of which we get postmodernism. Bataille was closely associated with Left Fascism, which he identified as his ideology, and which seeked to unify fascism with an even stronger version of socialism. He was anti-reason, anti-civilization, anti-ethics, pro-violence, and promoted the most perverse, unreproductive sexuality (these things are not hidden or hinted at, but are explicitly stated by Bataille, or explicitly shown in his fictional works).
The next two figures Wolin covers are less clearly associated with fascism.
Maurice Blanchot was a writer, who wrote articles against what he called the "inhuman Declaration of the Rights of Man," and who saw the "only solution to a dysfunctional republicanism" as a "fascist-type insurrection" (192). He also thought there was an "international conspiracy of communists, Jews, and capitalists" (Heidegger said that Germany was caught in the pincers of capitalism on one side, and communism on the other, both of which he said were metaphysically identical). His literary theories also became one of the cornerstones of poststructuralism – joining him with Bataille.
The most interesting person included in this work is Jacques Derrida, whose idea of deconstruction has led us into the postmodern era. Leaving aside Derrida’s attempts to deconstruct the Nazism of both Heidegger and Paul de Mann (to show they weren’t really all that fascist after all), and the fact that Derrida’s primary intellectual influences are Nietzsche and Heidegger, the connection to fascism seems, at first glance, weak. Certainly, Derrida is anti-reason. But for a long time, deconstruction was accused of being nonpolitical. Derrida’s response to this is what is interesting. He first responded by saying that deconstruction is in fact "hyper-political," particularly in its critique of democracy. His attacks on natural law also undermine the very foundations of democracy, on which democracy is founded. He also opposed the ideas of Law and Justice, saying that "justice, as opposed to law, always pertains to the case at hand in its irreducible individuality" (234). While there may be something to this, this should not, as Derrida suggests, mean we should do away with law. What is most interesting is that Derrida gets this idea form the Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt, who proclaimed that "the exception is more interesting than the rule" in his book Political Theology. He wants justice that is not grounded in law – which means he wants the rule of man, not the rule of law. Another problem with dealing with justice through the lens of the exceptional is that what we end up with is crisis "justice," which allows precisely for dictatorial decrees.
Wolin ends his book with a chapter on anti-Americanism, which he identifies precisely with anti-Enlightenment thinking. America is everything Europe was not: it has no racial foundations, the laws are based in reason rather than tradition, there is no nation to speak of, but rather federation with a fluid hierarchy (as opposed to the strict egalitarianism supported on the Continent, which has resulted in the periodic desire to eliminate those who will not fit into the egalitarian ideal state), it is a liberal capitalist state, individualistic, and free. Some of these things are still true. Wolin identifies current anti-Americanism in Europe with Heidegger’s, whose ideas on America were so purely intellectual, that they had no basis in reality. Certainly, Heidegger never traveled to America to learn anything about it. And because America is capitalist, and in Europe Jews are associated with capitalism, the anti-Semitism that still runs through Europe contributes to anti-Americanism. We see anti-Americanism in the present day, among postmodern thinkers such as Baudrillard, who claims that in America we believe in a "hyperreality" made up entirely of media-generated images, which have replaced reality. He sees America as a negative utopia. He has also expressed a great deal of joy over 9-11, and he is joined in this sentiment by Slavoj Zizek, who claimed in his book "The Desert of the Real" that "America got what it fantasized about," in our movies. In other words, we got what we had coming. Neither is concerned with morality in their commentaries – only with their interpretations of things. Which all too often have nothing to do with reality – and almost never have anything to do with reason. Anti-Enlightenment thought, which reached its worse manifestations in Nazi Germany, continue on – but with Wolin, it is no longer unchecked or unchallenged.

Critical Positions

First, all criticism must be done with love, can only be done from love. This is true in both arts criticism and critical art – or criticism of any kind. Criticism without love is spite. Those who criticize without loving what they criticize do so out of spite – too often because what they are criticizing is good, and they hate it for that very reason. Their only purpose is to tear down what they criticize. There are, of course, bad things that must be torn down, but one does not criticize these things – one attacks them.
We must criticize the arts or criticize through the arts as a parent criticizes a child (I use the word "criticize" here in the most positive way possible – as loving correction) – with the loving hope of bringing out what we know to be the best that child has to offer. But the child must know it is loved, must feel loved, before it can withstand criticism. Children who know they are loved can take loving criticism and use it to improve himself. Children who are not loved, who do not see the criticism as coming from love, will receive the criticism with resentment – and rightfully so. He will see criticism as something harmful, something meant to tear him down rather than lift him up. This lifting up, this is and should be the goal of all criticism.
My own particular field is literature, and so I shall use it as an example. In choosing a novel to critique, I would – and should – pick a novel I love, while avoiding novels I hate. There is an element of logic here – why would I want to spend more time with a novel I disliked and whose artistry I do not respect? Thus, I would never do a criticism of Cormac McCarthy’s Blood Meridian, which I consider to be the single worst novel I have ever read. Instead, I would rather do a criticism of, say, Don DeLillo’s Underworld (to pick another contemporary novelist), which I love immensely and, in my love of it, am able to see both what is good about the novel, as well as what does not quite work, in my opinion. I can do this because I am approaching the novel from a position of love.
Now some may object that a better position is that of neutrality. But neutrality is the same as saying indifference, and you are certainly unable to say anything either positive or negative, or constructive in any way, if you are indifferent. Only someone who loves something or someone will want to take the time and make the effort to critique it. Only someone who loves something or someone will want what is best for it. Even hatred is preferable to indifference – one can gain something from it, if one views such criticism with a cool eye. With hatred, at least some emotion was involved – they cared enough to hate. With indifference, nothing is accomplished – it is the true opposite of love (and love’s twin, hatred).
A good example of a loving critique is the creation of new art in response to the work(s) in question. I would never write a novel in response to Blood Meridian – to do so would be to acknowledge value where, in fact, I find none. But even though I have various philosophical problems with DeLillo’s paranoia, conspiracy-mentality, and apocalysm, all of which I reject, I do consider him worthy of emulating and of responding to artistically and philosophically. I am even now working on a novel that does just that – respond to DeLillo (and postmodernism in general) philosophically. Indeed, my novel would have been impossible without my having read Underworld.
So criticism must be done from love. Criticizing from hatred will not work because those being criticized will refuse to listen, meaning it cannot be constructive – and, in the end, what is criticism meant to be if not constructive? Criticizing from hatred will not work because we are blinded by that hatred to whatever value there is in the thing or person in question. And whose who are being critiqued will not listen to anything we have to say, because they know we do not have their best interests at heart. Thus, my position on not doing any criticism of Blood Meridian – lovers of the book will gain nothing from anything I have to say about it. But hopefully lovers of Underworld would be able to read a critique I wrote of it and be able to see it in a new light, uncover new beauties in it that had previously gone unseen, understand what I have a problem with in the book and why, and investigate with me the possible reasons for DeLillo’s choices. They will listen because they know I love the book.
The same is true of children – and of countries. Each must know the one being critical is only doing it out of love and only wants what is best – only wants to lift them up to greater heights, to make them a better person or a better country. Criticism from hatred is only meant to tear down, to destroy, not to build up – and the one who is being criticized knows this, no matter the objections of the one who criticizes from hatred. Everyone, from the time they were a small child, knows the difference. That is why criticism must always be done only from a position of love.

On the Oscars and Satire in Film

This year in film, what is perhaps most noticeable is what the Oscars and the Golden Globes both failed to notice – or, more accurately, recognize.
In 2004, we saw three different kinds of political movies: The Passion of the Christ, Fahrenheit 9/11, and Team America. The first thing to notice about these three movies is that they are each completely different from the others. The first is at first glance not a political movie at all – only an expression of faith. The second is a work of propaganda. The third is a work of satire.
Western civilization can be summed up as the tension between Athens and Jerusalem. Between free inquiry and obedient love – or, philosophy and faith. Since Descartes, we have been moving away from Jerusalem and toward Athens. The Passion was a reaffirmation of the increasingly neglected half of our civilization. As such, it is eminently political – and not just because a few people cannot tell the difference between the negative portrayal of a few historical Jewish people and true anti-Semitism (such critics ignore the fact that 1) many Jews in the film were portrayed positively, 2) Jesus was a Jew, and 3) Jesus’ crucifixion is not a negative thing for Christians – for without that death, there would be so salvation), which is only political in the most superficial sense of the word. In the truest sense of the political, it was meant to pull together those who share faith in Christ’s death, burial, and resurrection. This is why the movie upset so many people.
In the second half of the 20th century, philosophy increasingly gave way to pure rhetoric – and thus to postmodernism, which emphasizes propaganda by insisting that all communication is propaganda, since there is no truth. Its ultimate expression is in movies such as Fahrenheit 9/11, where the argument is made by clever editing (postmodern theory points out that you can create causal relationships in the minds of one’s audience by simply placing two things next to each other, or sandwiching, say, one news clip between two others, so that the two related clips create an association with the inserted, unrelated, clip in the minds of the viewers). Through editing, one can manipulate an audience to believe falsehoods, while also claiming (correctly) that everything you showed was factual. And it was, technically, based in fact. The facts were carefully selected and organized to make the particular argument he wished. And Michael Moore is not the only one doing this – pollsters have been doing this for years, since the way one asks the questions typically determines the answers. And the answers you want determines the way you word the questions. Thus, we get in the postmodern era the complete separation of truth and facts – so that facts do not have to have anything to do with the truth at all.
Satire does not try to provide answers, so it is a different kind of thing yet. Satire laughs at faith believed blindly, at people who support immoral things in the name or morality, at all the things we do that make us fall short of excellence. In Team America, nationalistic fervor and overenthusiasm, the tacit support of dictators by people on the Left, and poorly written and acted movies are all satirized. The topics range from art to politics – from Right to Left. Michael Moore is made to kill himself as a suicide bomber precisely because he’s a postmodern propagandist.
What is missing – and what, ironically, it is a movie like Team America that points out indirectly is missing – is philosophy. No one is engaging in free enquiry. We have religious faith only, or believe in cleverly edited propaganda pieces. Team America satirizes the fact that none of the characters in the movie – and none of the people the characters are satires of – care a thing about the truth (this is also why they satirize bad movies – since if "art tells the truth in the general form of a lie" as Nietzsche says, then bad art is equally far from the truth), which can only be discovered by truly free inquiry. It is ironic that it is a film described by someone as an "obscene puppet movie" that is trying to point out what is missing.
It is not surprising, perhaps, that Team America was ignored by the Oscars – satires are rarely recognized as art until decades, or even centuries, later. I doubt Team America crossed the minds of anybody when choosing Oscar nominees. And Hollywood is not religious enough to nominate The Passion. The surprise is the snubbing of Fahrenheit 9/11, which did, after all, win a People’s Choice Award. Perhaps even Hollywood is growing tired of Michael Moore. Self-righteous propaganda preferring dictators to democrats may involve good editing, b ut it does not equal good art.

An Apology for “Tumbling Woman”

With plans for the 9-11 site moving forward, I would like to make a suggestion for a centerpiece in the memorial section. One thing I wanted to happen to the site is already in the works: I felt the only proper response to the terrorist attacks was to build a new building that was even bigger than the twin towers – bigger than any building in the world. The 1776 foot (what a poetic height) tower designed to replace the twin towers fits the bill beautifully. The second thing I felt we needed to do was to have some sort of work of art that would forever remind us of what happened there. That has already been made – in 2002.
I have only seen Eric Fischl's "Tumbling Woman" statue on T.V., but I was astonished by it nonetheless. It is one of the most beautiful, moving, and appropriate works of art one could make in tribute to the victims of the twin towers. It is beautiful, moving, and appropriate because it is tragic. And tragic art is the only form of art that is appropriate in dealing with what happened on September 11th.
We Americans are used to thinking that good necessarily leads to good, and bad necessarily leads to bad. The good guy always wins, because he is good and does good. The villain always loses because he is evil and does evil. But what happens when good deeds, intentions, ideas, or decisions lead to bad consequences? Or what if you are not presented with a good decision at all? What happens when good people have to, due to the circumstances, make bad choices? We get tragedy. Such was the decision of those who jumped from the Trade Center towers. Faced with burning to death or falling to their deaths, many chose to fall. "Tumbling Woman" is a tribute to that terrible choice too many were forced to make.
The main objection people have made about the sculpture is that it is upsetting, that it disturbs those who see it. Good. That, after all, is what tragic art is supposed to do. It is meant to make us live (or, in this case, relive) strong emotions in a safe place so, in the future, should we be faced with such strong emotions (again), we will have learned how to more properly and appropriately deal with them. Tragedy is one of the strongest ways art can help us develop ourselves emotionally. By being exposed to this sculpture, we could be reminded of those emotions we felt when we saw the attacks and their aftermath unfolding, in a safe and healthy manner. It provides us with an emotional education, which will make us react to such emotions in the future in a more healthy manner. It will make us better people, stronger and healthier people. More heroic even than many were in the midst of the attacks. We cannot make what happened go away by getting rid of or hiding this sculpture. By even wanting to do so, we are in open denial. We are trying to suppress these feelings that we should feel, and that is unhealthy. We are trying to forget, and we should not.
I understand why people are upset over this sculpture. You should be. Actually, it should not be the sculpture that you should be upset at, but everything it manages to so beautifully represent. You should be upset at people being forced to choose between burning to death in an inferno caused by bad men flying planes into our tallest buildings, and jumping to their deaths. But denying those emotions is unhealthy. What "Tumbling Woman" manages to do, using the beauty and magnificence of tragedy, is allow us to deal with these emotions in an open, healthy manner. If it were possible, everyone should see it, gaze at it, contemplate it. Perhaps the 9-11 Memorial at the former World Trade Center site would be a good home for it. That way, we could all take it into our hearts and souls and learn, through it, the life lessons it can teach us, that tragedy alone can teach us about the world.

The Cure For AIDS

There are two reasons why we will not be finding a cure for AIDS anytime in the near future. And one of them is not the fact that we have never developed a cure for any virus before. We have vaccinated against viruses before (polio and smallpox being the most famously wiped out by vaccination – but why has it been so long since we had at minimum a vaccination cure?), but we have never developed a cure for one. Yet this is not the reason I am pessimistic.
I am fully confident that we will have the technological ability to wipe out AIDS. HIV has some features that make it one of the best candidates for being the first virus to be cured – even if it has other features that make a vaccine of it impossible. But technology is not the problem here. The problem is inherent in the social-political system. Nobody who could cure AIDS wants to.
This is not as insidious as it sounds. We are merely talking about incentives here. As comedian Chris Rock once said, they will never cure AIDS – the money’s not in the cure, it’s in the treatment. The money’s in the comeback. And he’s right. If a pharmaceutical company can keep you alive with AIDS for 50 years, they will. That’s 50 years of profits from treating you. This is in their best interests as a company. If they came up with a cure, there would be a short-term profit from selling it to everyone (assuming the government did not figure out a way to nationalize the cure, in the "best interest" of mankind), and then that would be the end of it. Once everyone was cured of AIDS, there would be no more HIV infections, and the cure would be useless. No company CEO in his right mind would want a product that eliminated its own need to be used.
The second reason why we will not be finding a cure for AIDS anytime in the near future is because of the way we fund AIDS research. There are university labs out there who are actively looking for a cure for AIDS – they are not tied into the company profit motive, so one could argue that they are more likely to find a cure. However, we have a similar problem here was we have with the companies. These labs get grants to look for a cure for AIDS. Please note my wording here: they get money to LOOK for a cure, not to FIND one. IF you know that so long as you are looking for something, you will continue to get millions of dollars, wouldn’t you continue to look, without bothering to find what you are looking for? Again, I don’t think this is a conscious choice. But the fact of the matter is that there are labs across the U.S. that would cease to get money year after year if a cure for AIDS were found. Thus, it is not in these labs’ best interest to find a cure – only to continue looking for one.
I’m sure there are a few people out there who sincerely want to find a cure for AIDS. Unfortunately, they are not numerous enough to increase the odds of actually finding a cure. We need to change the incentive structure. We need to stop paying people to look for a cure for AIDS, and instead pay them to find one. What this means is that we should at the very least create an award – perhaps a combination of government and private funding – for the person who finds a cure for AIDS. Various governments from around the world could contribute to it, as well as private individuals. And people could continue contributing to it over time. I would think that the award should be at least in the billions of dollars. It should be such a big award that any incentive not to find a cure is wiped out. And this award should be in addition to the money made from the cure itself being used.
We need to stop being romantic about somebody coming up with a cure out of the goodness of their hearts. A cure will only come about when a sufficiently large carrot is dangled in front of those who have the ability to develop a cure. None of this nonsense about what people "should" be doing, that they "should" find a cure because it’s the "right thing to do." If we want actual results (and the people who speak such nonsense do not want actual results, only to feel good about themselves having judged others for doing things for the "wrong" reasons), we have to change the structure of our incentives. This is the only way we will actually ever find a cure for AIDS. And once this works, we can move on to cancer and any of a number of other diseases. Cures will come only when we reward the finding of cures rather than the looking for them.

Milton Wilcain’s Intelligence

Milton Wilcain was obviously not a very smart man. Sure, he went to college, eventually receiving a Master's Degree, and he ran a business employing three hundred people, but we know he was unintelligent nonetheless. Despite these seeming contradictions, we can come to this conclusion because if he had been intelligent, he would have been allowed to keep his money to spend as he wanted and he would have been allowed to live as he wished, without anyone telling him how. Instead, other people took what he owned and used it better than he could have. But Milton was not content at being unintelligent, so he decided to run for the city council.

Milton soon proved that, as dim-witted as he was, clearly he was more intelligent than his opponent, and he was easily elected. As he took his seat on the council, he was certain he could feel his intelligence increasing. He was certain at the very least that he was more intelligent than the rest of the men in the city, save perhaps his fellow council members and the mayor. He did many brilliant things for the city, including figuring out a way to take more money from the lower and middle classes so a brand new Opera House could be built, and managing to keep the potholes down to a mere ten per block.

It soon became clear to Milton, though, that his rise in intelligence was not enough. He was certain he knew very well what the city needed, but since he was not allowed to make many decisions, it soon became apparent that he did not. Milton was at first confused. He was certain he knew more than either the state or federal government what the city needed, since he was living there, but then he remembered that as a private citizen he was obviously unaware of the best way in which to live, so he could possibly be wrong about whether or not he knew how to run a city better than the state, which is why Milton decided once again to try to raise his intelligence.

The run for the state legislature was rougher and closer, but Milton managed to prevail, clearly showing his superior intelligence. He moved with his family to the capitol, and as he neared it, he was certain he could feel his intelligence growing. But it was when he took his seat in the legislature that he became certain his intelligence had become higher than he remembered it. He became certain he was far more intelligent and knew the right and proper things to do than did the city governments and especially the private citizens. He made certain the cities, which were obviously run by a bunch of idiots who had no idea how to run a city let alone make peoples' lives better, did exactly what he decided they should do, whether he had been in the city or not. After all, as a state legislator, he knew what was best for the people, more than those morons running the cities. They were always asking for unimportant things like tax cuts and more money for roads. Milton had more important things to do for his citizens, such as building a new airport at the capitol and preventing new licenses from being given out so the state's largest company would not have any competition.

But again it did not take long before Milton came to realize he was not as intelligent as he could be. It was growingly obvious that, since he was not trusted to make the right decisions for his state, there were people more intelligent than he. Otherwise, they would have obviously allowed him to make more decisions about his state, since he lived there and therefore should have known more about it than the federal government. But this was clearly not the case. And Milton decided that he wanted to be more intelligent than he was.

Having won much praise from his fellow party members, he easily won a seat in Congress. With this win, it was apparent that Milton was one of a handful of the smartest men in the state. He could feel his intelligence increasing as he boarded the plane and took his seat. The rapid takeoff gave his mind a jolt of intelligence unlike any it had experienced, and he grew smarter and smarter the closer he came to Washington. Upon landing, he was bewildered at how intelligent he had become. He suddenly knew exactly what everyone needed and how they should run their lives. But it wasn't until he stepped into the capitol building that he really began to realize how important and brilliant he was compared to the average citizen, who he was certain could not feed, house, or clothe themselves without his legislative assistance, let alone educate their children or make good decisions, especially with their own money. So convinced was Milton of this later conclusion, the first thing he proposed was a tax increase, to make certain more of the citizen's money was spent properly. He was also convinced that the states, counties, and cities (need we include the ultimate example of mental dullness, the private citizen?) were full of idiots who were completely incapable of making good decisions for their citizens, and he worked to make sure the federal government had more and more power and was more capable of dictating to the local and state governments how they should be run. Milton was one of the country's most successful federal legislators and was highly praised by his party. After all, he managed to make sure more federal money was spent in his state than in any other, whether it was new bridges linking little-used roads or his fight for a new atomic clock being placed in his state (you can't be too certain what time it is, after all). In fact, before Milton arrived in Washington, nobody knew there were that many brilliant unknown artists in his state. There were few who had little to show for all they had done and spent. He was Washington's most successful legislator.

After many years, Milton decided to retire. His pension was large enough to live comfortably on and he was very happy with what he had accomplished. When his term ended, Milton cleared out his office and had everything sent back to his home state, which he hadn't seen since his last campaign. After the retirement party his comrades had thrown for him, Milton boarded his plane to leave his beloved Washington. But when he did, an amazing thing happened. His remarkable intelligence was beginning to disappear. As he crossed the country, Milton became dumber and dumber until finally, upon landing, he realized that he had become as stupid as he had been before he had embarked on his famous career. We know this because if he had been smart, he would have been allowed to keep his money to spend as he wanted and he would have been allowed to live as he wished, without anyone telling him how.

Libertarianism and Communitarianism

The argument over the moral underpinnings of libertarianism basically boils down to the fact that there is necessarily a communitarian element to ethics. If we accept that libertarianism means radical individualism, then libertarian ethics appears to be an oxymoron. And for those libertarians who do believe in the Cartesian form of individualism as the basis of libertarianism, it likely is an oxymoron. I’m not sure a libertarianism whose philosophical underpinnings are the same as those that gave us the French Revolution (especially the Terror), Naziism, and Communism is the kind of libertarianism we really want.
But there is another option: the option of the Scottish philosophers, and the communitarian individualism they espoused. In the Cartesian version, the person is a radical individual who defines himself, preferably apart from society. In the Scottish version, the person is an individual imbedded in a nested hierarchy of communities, including nuclear and extended families, churches, workplaces, schools, neighborhood and communities, towns and cities, counties, states, and nations. We are defined in various ways by each of these things, and we are different people in each of these different situations. Thus is our individuality defined within our social situation. Recent studies in anthropology, ethology, and primatology have shown that the Scottish philosophical tradition is much more accurate than is the Cartesian tradition.
At different levels within the hierarchy, we should expect different levels of communitarianism. Those levels wherein we can have the most information about the members within the level can and should be the most communitarian – and should therefore have the strongest moral rules. The family is a good example of this. No one in their right mind would want to run their household according to libertarian principles – this would be a recipe for disaster in raising children. As Walter Williams once said in a talk I saw him give: Marxism works, it’s how one should run one’s household. You should expect more from your spouse, and give more to your children. At this level, it is easy, as it is easy to keep up with the names. But when you cannot keep up with the names, when you can no longer recognize what is best for each individual (which you cannot do for someone whose name you do not know), then you have to ease the communitarian principles.
Churches, workplaces, and schools – and, to some extent, neighborhoods, communities, and towns – are places we voluntarily become members of. By joining these groups, we agree to their set of rules. Here we have a level of voluntary communitarianism – and if you are not a child, all communitarianism should be voluntary. And that is why all communitarianism should also be highly local – if we do not like the rules of the group we have joined, we can always vote with our feet. The problem with having communitarian states and nations is precisely that when we are talking about the size of a state or a nation, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to vote with one’s feet. Also, at these levels, it becomes increasingly difficult for the leaders to know the names of those they rule – and as such, they become increasingly ignorant of what is actually best for the citizens.
As we get farther away, as more people become included in the social system, as we have in a state or nation – or even in a large city – the ignorance of the leaders increases, and the only ethical approach to governance is precisely libertarianism. It is here where individualism should be taken into consideration, as it is the individual who is most affected by the laws passed at this level, even though they are farthest away from the leaders. At this level, one cannot make ethical choices for others, as you do not know the people well enough to know everything about them, to understand their overall circumstances. This is not to say that we should not have any ethical laws: what else are laws against the use of force or fraud, the only laws libertarians think governments should have? But these are laws that make sense to apply to everyone, across the board, regardless of race, religion, economic situation, etc. These are laws that are laws in every society, throughout human history and pre-history. But those ethical issues for which there is any debate should be avoided by states and nations. Those are values that can and should be taken into consideration closer to home. They are the communitarian values.

Values and the Election

For many years it was a common adage – believed equally by the Republicans and the Democrats – that high voter turnout was bad for the Republicans. Well, so much for that theory. This year’s election totals are among the highest in American history, and President Bush won re-election with well over 3 million votes. And he brought with him an increase in seats in both the House and the Senate, thus breaking another stereotype of the incumbent losing seats in their re-elections.
What will be the results of this? One hopes that there will be less interest by the Republicans in suppressing the vote (however much this is actually true, and not Democrat propaganda – a good possibility, since they are very good at propaganda, as one sees in their convincing African Americans to vote Democrat, even though it was a Republican President who sent the national guard into Little Rock to force integration, there was a higher percentage of Republicans than Democrats who voted for the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and it was Richard Nixon who instituted Affirmative Action). At the same time, we may begin to see Democrats trying to do what they can to suppress votes – especially in the South.
We might also see increased interest in both parties in social conservatism. It was ethical issues, after all, that led in exit polls among reasons why people voted for Bush. I doubt that the Republicans can get much more conservative for Americans, but certainly the Democrats can. And if they want to win in the South, West, and certain parts of the Midwest, they will have to. It seems very likely that both parties will become more communitarian – a trend libertarians will have to work hard to hold in check. If the Democrats become more socially conservative, and Bush continues to spend money like a Democrat, the slim differences between the parties will become slimmer.
Of course, in the near future, we can probably expect the Democrats to become more shrill – including on social issues. The citizens of the flyover states will likely be decried as backwards barbarians little better than the Taliban in their support for oppressing homosexuals’ rights. If they take that approach, we can expect some backlash against the Democrats in the midterm elections in two years. If the Democrats take another election hit, I have little doubt that they will indeed start trending toward social conservatism.
So what is a libertarian to do? I’m not sure we can do much in the near future. We may be entering into a new "ethical" cycle, as much in response to the postmoderns’ insistence that there are no values as anything else (and the problem with Kerry was precisely that – he did not represent civil libertarian values, because he did not represent any kind of values at all). With 9-11, we saw what happens when people do not value life. And this election was a response to that kind of lack of values. With 9-11, we saw what those who preach against values really meant. Between Bush and Kerry, it was Bush who represented values, and in a country who is slowly rediscovering the value of values, we should not be surprised at a Bush win.
If we want to protect libertarian ethics, we need to make the argument precisely from the position of ethics and values. Our arguments have to become more substantial and, at the same time, more impassioned. People support those who are passionate enough in something to express emotions – reason is hardly, and never has been, enough. And we cannot rely on the Democrats to articulate these values either, as they do not believe in them as values, but only as pragmatic positions to get them votes from certain segments of society, any more than we can rely on Republicans to support true free markets and the sciences (many of those who voted on values are also those who do not believe the universe began in a Big Bang, or that evolution is a fact – two dangerous positions for the advance of the sciences). If we want to protect our values, we have to do it ourselves – and we have to do it precisely by articulating them as values. That should be the lesson learned from this election.